Supply-side factors influencing informal payment for healthcare services in Tanzania. by Binyaruka, Peter et al.
Supply-side factors influencing informal
payment for healthcare services in Tanzania
Peter Binyaruka 1,*, Dina Balabanova2, Martin McKee 2,
Eleanor Hutchinson2, Antonio Andreoni3, Mary Ramesh1,
Blake Angell 4,5, Ntuli A Kapologwe 6 and Masuma Mamdani1
1Department of Health System, Impact Evaluation and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, PO Box 78373, Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania
2Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock
Place, London WC1H 9SH, UK
3UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, 11 Montague Street, London WC1B 5BP, UK
4The George Institute for Global Health, University of New South Wales Sydney, Sydney, Australia
5UCL Institute for Global Health, 30 Guilford Street, London WC1N 1EH, UK
6President’s Office—Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG), Dodoma, Tanzania
*Corresponding author. Department of Health System, Impact Evaluation and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, PO Box
78373, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. E-mail: pbinyaruka@ihi.or.tz
Accepted on 23 February 2021
Abstract
Informal payments for healthcare are widespread in sub-Saharan Africa. They are often regressive,
potentially limiting access to quality healthcare, particularly for the most vulnerable, and can have
catastrophic consequences for households. Yet there is little empirical research that uses theory-
driven hypotheses to explore what influences informal payments and, especially, from health
workers’ perspectives. Consequently, we have explored the characteristics of health workers and
facilities influencing informal payments in Tanzania, examining two hypotheses: health workers
with power and position in the system are more likely to receive informal payments, and transpar-
ency and accountability measures can be bypassed by those who can game the system. We con-
ducted a cross-sectional survey of 432 health workers from 42 public health facilities (hospitals and
health centres) in 12 district councils from Pwani and Dar es Salam regions in Tanzania. Our de-
pendent variable was whether the health worker has ever asked for or been given informal pay-
ments or bribes, while explanatory variables were measured at the individual and facility level.
Given the hierarchical structure of the data, we used a multilevel mixed-effect logistic regression to
explore the determinants. Twenty-seven percent of 432 health workers ever engaged in informal
payment. This was more common amongst younger (<35 years) health workers and those higher
in the hierarchy (specialists and heads of departments). Those receiving entitlements and benefits
in a timely manner and who were subject to continued supervision were significantly less likely to
receive informal payments. The likelihood of engaging in informal payments varied among health
workers, consistent with our first hypothesis, but evidence on the second hypothesis remains
mixed. Thus, policy responses should address both individual and system-level factors, including
ensuring adequate and progressive health sector financing, better and timely remuneration of
frontline public health providers, and enhanced governance and supervision.
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Introduction
Out-of-pocket payments (OOPs) for health care are a barrier to
achieving Universal Health Coverage (WHO, 2010) but remain wide-
spread in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), despite
being inequitable, often regressive, and inefficient as a financing mech-
anism (Asante et al., 2016). Many countries are working to extend
and strengthen prepayment mechanisms (e.g. general taxation and
health insurance) to ensure financial protection (WHO, 2010; Kutzin,
2013). However, they have often focused on formal OOP, giving less
attention to informal payments (Hutchinson et al., 2019). Informal
payments include payments to individual healthcare workers or their
facilities, in kind or in cash, made outside official payment channels,
including payments for drugs/supplies that should be covered by the
health system (Gaal et al., 2006a; Lewis, 2007). They are encouraged
by characteristics of clinical encounters, where health workers can ex-
ploit information asymmetry, uncertainty and power imbalance
(Ensor and Witter, 2001; Savedoff, 2007; Vian, 2008) and the broader
context (Schaaf and Topp, 2019).
The existing literature identifies three consequences of informal
payments. First, they can create barriers to care (Ensor and Cooper,
2004; O’Donnell, 2007), increasing the risk of catastrophic expend-
iture (WHO, 2010) and undermining confidence in public institutions
(Clausen et al., 2011; Habibov, 2016). Second, they may respond to a
dysfunctional system (Méon and Weill, 2010), overcoming inefficien-
cies or bureaucratic obstacles to service delivery (Leff, 1964; Gaal and
McKee, 2004) or motivating providers to stay at their post, supple-
menting their low salaries (Gaal and McKee, 2004; Lewis, 2007;
Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011). They may even redistribute resources
to the poor, when health workers only seek them from those who can
pay (Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998) and can encourage public facilities
to compete with private ones (Rose, 1998). Third, informal payments
can represent cultural norms of gratitude (Smith, 2008; Truex, 2011;
Lee and Guven, 2013), with material consequences only if they are
large or frequent (Gaal et al., 2006a).
Much research on informal payments is from Central and
Eastern Europe (e.g. Thompson and Witter, 2000; Balabanova and
McKee, 2002; Ensor, 2004; Gaal et al., 2006b; Dabalen and Wane,
2008; Horodnic et al., 2018), or Asia (e.g. Nahar and Costello,
1998; Barber et al., 2004; Meskarpour Amiri et al., 2019), with less
in South America (e.g. Gatti et al., 2003) and Africa (e.g. McPake
et al., 1999; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Kankeu and Ventelou,
2016). Several factors encourage persistence of informal payments,
both demand-side (e.g. patients and community characteristics) and
supply-side factors (e.g. health system and providers’ characteris-
tics). However, most studies on the determinants of informal pay-
ment have focused on users’ (demand-side factors) rather than
providers’ perspectives (supply-side factors) (Dabalen and Wane,
2008; Kankeu et al., 2016); and few offer a theory-informed
interpretation.
Here, we apply a novel lens to the analysis of informal payments
in Tanzania, drawing on political settlement theory (Behuria, 2017;
Khan, 2018). This focuses on the distribution of power among dif-
ferent actors in each sector-country context. It does so by looking at
the capabilities of relevant actors (and their clientelist networks),
and how these capabilities (and networks) allow them to mobilize
resources and extract potential rents from existing policies and insti-
tutions (for a review of alternative political settlement approaches,
see Behuria, 2017). This theory has been developed within the Anti-
Corruption Evidence (ACE) research programme that includes
Nigeria and Bangladesh along with Tanzania, the focus of this art-
icle (Khan et al., 2019). For brevity, we refer to this as the ACE ap-
proach. It recognizes two key issues arising where formal rules are
weakly enforced and widely violated by powerful groups. The first
is the importance of disentangling the distribution of organizational
power in each sector—its ‘political settlement’—and mapping the in-
centive structures arising from opportunities for rent-capture and
vulnerability to corruption. Second, it hypothesizes that traditional
top-down anti-corruption strategies—such as transparency and
accountability measures—will be effective ‘only if’ they are comple-
mented with bottom-up strategies, taking into account the sector-
specific political settlement. If particular anti-corruption strategies
are aligned with the interests of enough players who have sufficient
bargaining power in a sector, and take into account differences in
incentives and actors’ conditions, formal rules are more likely to be
enforced over time.
In the health sector, at facility level in the privacy of the consult-
ation room, health workers have power to provide or withhold serv-
ices. However, some have more power than others, hence more or
less scope to exploit corruption vulnerabilities and bypass formal en-
forcement mechanisms. Moreover, in their decisions, health workers
are influenced by different working conditions and considerations.
This heterogeneity matters not only for understanding drivers of in-
formal payments, but also to design tailored anti-corruption
responses and improve outcomes in the sector.
Drawing on our theoretical approach, we hypothesize that: (1) a
particular subset of providers who have formal (and potentially in-
formal) power and position within the health system may be more
likely to obtain informal payments; (2) transparency and account-
ability measures such as electronic billing and public information
are likely to be bypassed by those who can game the system. To test
these hypotheses, we examine characteristics of health workers and
health facilities associated with informal payments in Tanzania,
where they are common and take many forms (Kruk et al., 2008;
Stringhini et al., 2009; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Lindkvist,
2013). The first hypothesis has some support in the literature, main-
ly from outside Africa, but there is less related to the second one.
The theoretical lenses we adopted in this study allows a more
nuanced understanding of power distribution—both powers
KEY MESSAGES
• Informal payments are widespread in Africa, yet there is little empirical research.
• In Tanzania, 27% of 432 health workers engaged in informal payments.
• Payments are less common where there is regular remuneration and supportive supervision.
• Existing transparency and accountability mechanisms are not associated with fewer payments.
• Anti-corruption approaches need to address both individual and system-level factors.
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associated with formal status in the health facility, but also informal
relationships. They also account for situations where powerful indi-
viduals can game the system and evade transparency and account-
ability rules while extracting large rents through informal payments.
Study setting
This study took place in Tanzania, a lower middle-income country
in East Africa with an estimated population of around 56 million
people in 2016 (NBS, 2013). Tanzania is divided into 31 regions
and most (70%) inhabitants reside in rural areas. Most health facili-
ties (70%) are government owned. The public health system is
organized hierarchically, with dispensaries, health centres and dis-
trict hospitals providing primary healthcare; while regional referral,
zonal and national hospitals provide secondary and tertiary care.
The health system is highly decentralized and local providers have
autonomy to plan and manage resources as their funds are received
through direct health facility financing approach (Frumence et al.,
2013; Kapologwe et al., 2019).
The Tanzanian health system is facing systemic challenges,
including shortages and maldistribution of medicines and supplies
(Wales et al., 2014) and of health workers, with specialists concen-
trated in urban settings (Afnan-Holmes et al., 2015). Health work-
ers are paid monthly salaries, but these are widely perceived as
insufficient to live on. Some health workers are eligible to receive
certain allowances (extra duty, on-call, etc.) although these are often
unpredictable and paid with frequent delays. These characteristics
reflect inadequate health financing. For instance, in 2018/19, about
9% of Tanzanian government expenditure was allocated to health—
below the Abuja declaration target of 15% (MOHCDGEC, 2019a).
The health financing system is highly fragmented. In 2015/16,
for example, the healthcare budget came from general taxation
(34%), donor support (36%), OOPs (22%) and health insurance
contributions (8%) (MOHCDGEC, 2019b). In 2019, about 32% of
Tanzanians were covered by health insurance, with 8% (public serv-
ants) in the National Health Insurance Fund, 23% (informal work-
ers) by the Community Health Fund and 1% with private insurance
(MOHCDGEC, 2019a). However, a majority, and especially infor-
mal workers, pay out-of-pocket. The poor and vulnerable groups
(e.g. pregnant women, children and elders) should receive a fee-
exemption and waiver in Tanzania, but these policies are weakly
enforced and exempted people continue to pay out-of-pocket (Kruk
et al., 2008; Maluka, 2013).
Materials and methods
Data source
We conducted a cross-section survey of public health workers in
eleven districts, five from the Dar es Salaam region and six from
Pwani region. The two regions represent urban and rural/peri urban
settings in Tanzania. The survey was undertaken from July to
August 2019 across 42 health facilities. We included all public hos-
pitals (n¼14, 33.3%) and health centres (n¼28, 66.6%) in two
regions, excluding only the national hospital, military and special-
ized hospitals. We drew a convenience sample of health workers
from those present on the day, selected purposively to include indi-
viduals in different departments and levels of seniority. We included
a minimum of five medical staff at each facility. The final sample
comprised 432 health workers from all 42 facilities (Table 1). One
hundred and eighty-eight (43.5%) worked in hospitals and 244
(56.5%) in health centres. Trained enumerators collected data using
a structured questionnaire loaded on tablet devices, and the inter-
views were undertaken in Swahili.
Outcome and explanatory variables
Our outcome of interest was informal payment, coded as 1 if a
health worker has ever asked/given informal payment or bribe at the
workplace, and 0 otherwise. This variable was measured in a survey
through the following question: ‘Have you ever asked for/been given
informal payment/bribe from clients?’
Given the hierarchical structure of the data, our explanatory var-
iables were considered at two levels: individual- and facility. These
two levels reflect our two hypotheses of providers’ power/position
and availability of governance structure at facility, respectively. The
‘individual/health worker characteristics’ included: age, gender,
health worker cadre, marital status, position at facility (whether in-
charge or not), work experience in years and whether has any sup-
plementary job for private income. Other variables such as educa-
tion, qualification and salary, were dropped to avoid
multicollinearity as they significantly correlated with medical/pro-
vider cadre (e.g. specialist, clinician or nurses) (a relatively import-
ant factor to inform policy interventions).
The ‘facility-level characteristics’ (also referred to as contextual/
supply-side factors) included the following dummy variables: avail-
ability of supervision/oversight throughout, availability of electronic
mode of payment, availability of an accountant, availability of a no-
ticeboard to display fee structure and service offered, availability of
health facility governing committee (HFGC) and level of care (i.e.
hospital and health centre). Additional explanatory factors were
continuous variables, rating various aspects of the working environ-
ment, such as availability of medical commodities, facility infra-
structure condition, staffing level and condition regarding provision
of entitlement and benefits, on a scale of 1 to 10.
Analysis
Since individual health workers were nested within facilities, a
multilevel modelling technique was preferred to account for the hier-
archical structure of the data (Hox et al., 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2008). Multilevel modelling estimates both individual and
group-level effects simultaneously. We further assumed potential
variation between facilities to support random effects estimation
through mixed-effects model.
We therefore started by estimating a multilevel mixed-effect lo-
gistic regression. Prior to mixed-effects model, we estimated an
empty/random intercept model to test through a likelihood test
whether random intercept variations are present. The likelihood
ratio test for the intercept only model was significant (P¼0.0177),
indicating a significant improvement in fit with random intercepts
compared to a standard logistic model. Thereafter, we estimated a
mixed-effects model with multiple predictors (at individual and
facility level), and obtained a likelihood ratio test with insignificant
Table 1 Sample characteristics
Number of healthcare workers %
Region (n¼ 432)
Dar es Salaam 194 44.9
Pwani 238 55.1
Facility level of care (n¼ 432)
Hospitals 188 43.5
Health centres 244 56.5
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P-value of 0.3734. This indicated that the mixed-effects model does
not represent a significant improvement in fit compared to a stand-
ard logistic model (Hox et al., 2005). We similarly estimated the
intraclass correlation (ICC) after the mixed-effects model, and
obtained a value of 0.0156. Since the ICC is smaller approaching
zero, there is evidence of limited between-facility variation as com-
pared to within-facility variation. This support the decision not to
use random effects but rather use a standard logistic model with
clustering (Heck et al., 2013). Based on prior results, we decided to
estimate the significant determinants of engaging in informal pay-
ments through a standard logistic model while clustering at the facil-
ity level as follows.
Logit pr Yij
  
¼ a þ b1 Xij þ b2Zj þ eij
Where i and j are individual health worker and health facility, re-
spectively. Yij is a binary outcome of interest (whether engaged in in-
formal payment); Xij included individual health worker covariates,
Zj included health facility level covariates, and eij is the individual
error term. All analyses were performed in STATA 16.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Of 432 health workers surveyed, the majority were female (64%),
nurses and midwives (39%), married (71%), subordinate to those in
charge of units (54%) and did not have supplementary job(s) (61%)
(Table 2). They averaged 7 years of experience at their working sta-
tion. One hundred and seventeen (27.1%) reported engaging in in-
formal payment by either asking for or receiving one at their
workplace. Turning to the facilities where they worked, a few have
continuous supervision (40%) and an electronic mode of payment
(26%). However, most facilities have an accountant (91%), a no-
ticeboard showing payment procedures and services offered (93%),
and an HFGC (58%) (Table 2). Average ratings of the condition of
Table 2 Description of providers’ characteristics and their probability of engaging in informal payment (n¼ 432)
Sample Engaging in informal payment (n¼ 117, 27.1%)
Variables Description n % n %
Panel A: Individual factors
Age 20–34 years 154 35.7% 53 34.4%
35–44 years 135 31.3% 32 23.7%
45–60 years 143 33.1% 32 22.4%
Gender Male 157 36.3% 42 26.7%
Female 275 63.7% 75 27.3%
Medical cadre Medical specialist 31 7.2% 12 38.7%
Medical officer and Clinical officer 117 27.1% 35 29.9%
Nurse and Midwives 167 38.7% 46 27.5%
Others (e.g. paramedics) 117 27.1% 24 20.5%
Marital status Married 306 70.8% 84 27.5%
Not married 126 29.2% 33 26.2%
Position at the facility level In-charge of the department/unit 199 46.1% 63 31.7%
Not in-charge 233 53.9% 54 23.2%
Experience at the facility level Number of years at a facility (SD) 432 6.9 (7.5)
Supplementary job Has any supplementary job to earn income 168 38.9% 49 29.2%
No supplementary job 264 61.1% 68 25.8%
Panel B: Facility factors
Supervision throughout Facility with supervision throughout 171 39.6% 29 16.9%
No 261 60.4% 88 33.7%
Electronic mode of payment Yes—facility with electronic payment 114 26.4% 26 22.8%
No 318 73.6% 91 28.6%
Availability of an accountant Yes—facility with an accountant 393 91.0% 110 27.9%
No 39 9.0% 7 17.9%
Availability of a noticeboard Yes—facility with a noticeboard 403 93.3% 109 27.1%
No 29 6.7% 8 27.6%
Availability of HFGC Yes—facility with a HFGC 249 57.6% 73 29.3%
No 183 42.4% 44 24.0%
Availability of health
commodities
Average rating between 1–10 (SD) 432 6.6 (2.2)
Facility infrastructure
condition
Average rating between 1–10 (SD) 432 6.7 (2.3)
Staffing level Average rating between 1–10 (SD) 432 4.5 (2.1)
Entitlements and benefits
condition
Average rating between 1–10 (SD) 432 4.3 (2.5)
Facility level of care Hospital 188 43.5% 48 25.5%
Health centre 244 56.5% 69 28.3%
Region Dar es Salaam 194 44.9% 50 25.8%
Pwani 238 55.1% 67 28.2%
Notes: HFGC, Health Facility Governing Committee; SD, standard deviation.
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the working environment (on a 1–10 scale, with 10 best) were
around 6.6 for availability of medical commodities and infrastruc-
ture condition, while staffing levels and provision of entitlement and
benefits were around 4.3.
Factors influencing informal payment
The results are presented in two models (Table 3), with model 1
showing results from mixed-effects model, while model 2 showing
results from a standard logistic model with clustering at the facility
level. As indicated in the analysis section, we had to estimate the lo-
gistic model (model 2) because the mixed-effects model (model 2)
did not reflect improvement in model estimation. This was con-
firmed through a likelihood ratio test and ICC estimate.
Consequently, the regression results from both models were almost
similar, with few exceptions (Table 3). Our discussion of results,
therefore, focused on the estimates from model 2 as the standard lo-
gistic model with clustering at the facility level.
The results from model 2 show that the likelihood of engaging in
informal payment was significantly associated with health workers’
age and cadre (Table 3). Specifically, health workers aged between
35 and 44 years and between 45 and 60 years were less likely to en-
gage in informal payment with odds ratios of [AOR¼0.46 (confi-
dence interval (CI): 0.25–0.84)] and [AOR¼0.44 (CI: 0.20–0.95)],
respectively, compared to younger health workers aged between 20
and 34 years. Moreover, the probability of engaging in informal
payment was significantly higher among specialists [AOR¼2.60
(CI: 0.89–7.55)] compared to low-level cadres/seniority (e.g. para-
medic, pharmacist, laboratory technicians, etc.). In other words,
Table 3 Logistic regression results
Model 1 Mixed-effects model Model 2 Logistic model
Variables Description AOR (95% CI) AOR (95% CI)
Panel A: Individual factors
Age 20–34 years 1.00 1.00
35–44 years 0.46 (0.25–0.86)** 0.46 (0.25–0.84)**
45–60 years 0.44 (0.22–0.86)** 0.44 (0.20–0.95)**
Gender Male 0.72 (0.42–1.24) 0.72 (0.39–1.28)
Female 1.00 1.00
Medical cadre Medical specialist 2.60 (0.99–6.82)* 2.60 (0.89–7.55)*
Medical officer and Clinical officer 1.95 (0.98–3.89)* 1.93 (0.73–5.13)
Nurse and Midwives 1.52 (0.79–2.94) 1.50 (0.71–3.18)
Others (e.g. paramedics) 1.00 1.00
Marital status Married 1.21 (0.70–2.08) 1.20 (0.67–2.16)
Not married 1.00 1.00
Position at the facility level In-charge of the department/unit 1.69 (1.02–2.81)** 1.72 (1.15–2.57)***
Not in-charge 1.00 1.00
Experience at the facility level Number of years at a facility 1.00 (0.96–1.04) 1.00 (0.97–1.03)
Supplementary job Has any supplementary job to earn income 1.44 (0.87–2.37) 1.43 (0.89–2.31)
No supplementary job 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Facility factors
Supervision throughout Facility with supervision throughout 0.43 (0.26–0.73)*** 0.43 (0.26–0.70)***
No 1.00 1.00
Electronic mode of payment Yes—facility with electronic payment 0.77 (0.40–1.47) 0.77 (0.38–1.57)
No 1.00 1.00
Availability of an accountant Yes—facility with an accountant 1.90 (0.74–4.92) 1.91 (0.53–6.88)
No 1.00 1.00
Availability of a noticeboard Yes—facility with a noticeboard 0.89 (0.34–2.35) 0.89 (0.38–2.07)
No 1.00 1.00




Average rating between 1–10 0.98 (0.86–1.11) 0.98 (0.88–1.09)
Facility infrastructure
condition
Average rating between 1–10 1.05 (0.93–1.17) 1.05 (0.93–1.17)
Staffing level Average rating between 1–10 1.09 (0.97–1.24) 1.09 (0.98–1.22)
Entitlements and benefits
condition
Average rating between 1–10 0.85 (0.76–0.96)*** 0.85 (0.76–0.95)***
Facility level of care Hospital 1.00 1.00
Health centre 1.05 (0.62–1.78) 1.05 (0.65–1.69)
Region Pwani 1.00 1.00
Dar es Salaam 1.13 (0.64–1.97) 1.12 (0.60–2.09)
Number of observation (n) 432 432
SD of random intercept 0.228
P-value LR test vs logistic model 0.373
Log likelihood –228.1 –228.1
Notes: AOR, adjusted odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; SD, standard deviation; HFGC, Health Facility Governing Committee; Model 1 is for mixed-effects
model while Model 2 is for standard logistic regression model; *** denotes significance at 1%, **at 5% and *at 10% level.
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being a specialist increased the chances of engaging in informal pay-
ment by almost three times (and by two times for medical doctors),
compared to other providers (e.g. paramedics) (Table 3). Moreover,
being in charge of the department increased the likelihood of engag-
ing in informal payment significantly [AOR¼1.72 (CI: 1.15–2.57)]
(Table 3). Among facility-level factors, receiving informal payments
was less likely among those with supervision throughout [AOR ¼
0.43 (CI: 0.26–0.70)]. Furthermore, higher perceived ratings on pro-
vision of entitlements and benefits significantly reduced the prob-
ability of engaging in informal payment (Table 3). Specifically, a
single point increase in this rating significantly reduced the chances
of informal payment by a factor of 0.85 (95% CI: 0.76–0.95).
We further sought to examine the effects on subgroup within
provider, in relation to identified significant factors in Table 3 (e.g.
supervision throughout and timely provision of entitlements and
benefits at facility) that reduced the chances of engaging in informal
payments. Subgroup effects showed that the effect of supervision
was much stronger and significant among the younger and older
staff than middle age staff; among medical officers/clinicians and
nurses/midwives than specialist and paramedics; it did not vary in
terms of staff position at the facility or whether a staff member has a
supplementary job (Table 4, column 1). It had no effect on the spe-
cialists who were most likely to engage in informal payments. In
terms of entitlements and benefits provision, the effect was signifi-
cantly stronger in older compared to the younger providers; in med-
ical officers/clinicians and lower cadres (e.g. paramedics) than
specialist and nurses/midwives; and in those with no supplementary
job (Table 4, column 2). Timely payment of entitlements and bene-
fits was associated with fewer informal payments among older pro-
viders and certain cadres (medical officers and paramedics), and
particularly among those with no additional job.
Discussion
Our study identified supply-side factors influencing the practice of
informal payments in Tanzania. We found that 27% out of 432
health workers engaged in informal payment, and the practice was
common especially amongst younger (<35 years) and more senior
(e.g. specialists) health workers, as well as heads of departments. We
also found that good provision of entitlements and benefits and con-
tinued supervision was associated with less informal payment.
According to our first hypothesis, while 27% health workers
ever engaged in informal payment, this varied by health workers’
characteristics. For instance, the age of health workers significantly
affected their likelihood of engaging in informal payment.
Specifically, younger health workers (<35 years) were more likely to
engage in informal payment than older ones. This could reflect how
younger health workers are more likely to have lower salaries than
their older or more senior colleagues, so that informal payment is a
compensating mechanism.
In terms of providers’ cadre and position, being more senior (e.g.
specialists) was significantly associated with a higher likelihood of
engaging in informal payment, as was a leadership role at the facil-
ity. This may reflect how senior staff and specialists are better able
to solicit informal charges as they offer more specialized services,
i.e. have more opportunities to engage in informal payments. A pro-
vider with higher professional status may be able to negotiate with
patients from a position of authority. This echoes findings from
Tajikistan that doctors were more likely to seek informal payment
than lower staff in the hierarchy such as nurses, attendants and ad-
ministrative staff (Dabalen and Wane, 2008). Similarly, a study by
Miller et al. (2000) in four countries (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia
and the Czech Republic) found that doctors received money and ex-
pensive presents while nurses received flowers, chocolate, and simi-
lar gifts of low value. Informal payments were also unequally
distributed among health workers in Hungary (Gaal et al., 2006b)
and Bulgaria (Balabanova and McKee, 2002), with a larger share of
the money going to family doctors and specialists. Other scholars
found informal payments were more prevalent in the emergency
departments or hospital units providing surgical services (Jafari
et al., 2015; Khodamoradi et al., 2018), which is consistent with our
finding because most specialists and senior doctors work in emer-
gency or surgical departments.
Table 4 Sub-group effects with univariate regression analysis
Sub-group sample Effect of continuous
supervision on IP
Effect of timely entitlements and
benefits provision on IP
(n) (1) (2)
All sample 432 –0.167*** –0.026***
Sub-groups
Age of the health worker
20–34 years 154 –0.263*** –0.017
35–44 years 135 –0.059 –0.027*
45–60 years 143 –0.170*** –0.031**
Medical cadre of the health worker
Medical specialist 31 –0.283 –0.066*
Medical officer and Clinician 117 –0.188** –0.028**
Nurse and Midwives 167 –0.182*** –0.018
Others (e.g. paramedics) 117 –0.099 –0.032**
Position at the facility
In-charge of unit 199 –0.172*** –0.029**
Normal staff 233 –0.160*** –0.026**
Having supplementary job
Yes 168 –0.181** –0.008
No 264 –0.159*** –0.039***
Notes: Univariate regression analysis involved regressing a dependant variable with one independent variable only; *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%
and * at 10% level
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We did not find a significant association between health work-
ers’ gender and informal payment, even though more specialists
were male (61%) and more heads of units were female (56%). The
lack of a significant association with gender is consistent with some
studies (e.g. Dabalen and Wane, 2008) but not others (e.g. Swamy
et al., 2001; Duflo and Topalova, 2004). We also found no signifi-
cant association between informal payments and health workers’
marital status or facility type (e.g. level of care). Other studies have
reported an association with facility type (in terms of ownership)
(Kankeu et al., 2016; Khodamoradi et al., 2018) but, overall, evi-
dence of an association between informal payments and facility
ownership remains inconclusive in the literature.
The evidence on our second hypothesis is mixed. Frequently rec-
ommended oversight mechanisms, such as electronic payment, an
accountant to check for fraud, and HFGCs were not significant.
Nor were measures encouraging transparency, such as a noticeboard
publicizing rules, services offered and rates of user fees. The evi-
dence on HFGC remains mixed, with some studies suggesting that
they can stimulate bottom-up accountability and possibly reduce in-
formal payments (Gatti et al., 2003; Rispel et al., 2016), while
others are less positive.
Higher levels of supervision and oversight were, however, signifi-
cantly associated with lower levels of informal payment. This is in-
tuitive and consistent with other evidence that supportive
supervision and oversight facilitate implementation of any interven-
tion. For instance, the implementation of the pro-poor exemption
policy in Tanzania was more successful in districts with high com-
mitment by health managers and local government officials, and in
districts with regular supervisory visits (Maluka, 2013). Thus, regu-
lar supervision visits and oversight at the facility level, especially of
heads of units and senior specialists, may act as a disincentive to
health workers asking for informal payments. Importantly, supervi-
sion did not deter everyone equally. For example, it was not associ-
ated with fewer informal payments among senior specialists, while
having a formal management role did not make a difference. This
may be because specialists have higher status, stronger informal con-
nections, and thus can avoid penalties. The role of informal relation-
ships and networks needs further study, e.g. asking providers about
their relationship with their supervisors.
It is, of course, possible that informal payments simply reflect
low pay of health workers, especially for younger staff, with lower
salaries and family responsibilities. Thus, timely provision of entitle-
ments and benefits was associated with lower levels of informal pay-
ments. This was particularly the case for those with no
supplementary job to augment their income. Low income and inad-
equate entitlements and benefits in most cases reflect inadequate
health sector funding, so health workers may see informal payments
as a coping mechanism (survival corruption) (Belita et al., 2013).
Our findings on timely provision of entitlements and benefits are
consistent with evidence from Cameroon (Kankeu et al., 2016) and
Tajikistan (Dabalen and Wane, 2008). The likelihood of engaging in
informal payment was higher in facilities where health workers
received inadequate remuneration (Kankeu et al., 2016), and among
health workers receiving below their perceived fair-wage in
Tajikistan (Dabalen and Wane, 2008). Other studies have also iden-
tified low salaries as important determinants of informal payment
(Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Belli and Shahriari, 2002; Vian
et al., 2006; Jahangiri and Aryankhesal, 2017).
Informal payments can have many unwanted consequences rang-
ing from impoverishment, inability to access care which is often of
poor quality, low satisfaction with care and mistrust (Bardhan, 1997;
Azfar et al., 2001; Cho and Kirwin, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Habibov,
2016). Corruption can also undermine progress to improved service
delivery by eroding confidence in public institutions (Clausen et al.,
2011), potentially creating vicious circles (Cho and Kirwin, 2007).
Other scholars have proposed that corruption can strengthen trust if
bribes enable access to otherwise inaccessible services (Méon and
Weill, 2010), but this is contested (Lavallée et al., 2008).
Our study has several policy implications. First, since the chances
of engaging in informal payment varied by type of provider, we need
to clarify who benefits from informal payments and who can be influ-
enced through targeted incentives or penalties. Second, we must move
beyond commonly recommended approaches involving accountability
and transparency measures that may have limited impact and can be
bypassed. However, other aspects of oversight, like supervision remain
important; although evidence is being mixed, supportive supervision is
anyway important for human resource management but it deters only
some people from engaging in corrupt practices. Our theoretical model
suggests a need for measures, adopting innovative strategies adapted to
context. Third, there should be adequate health funding to ensure suffi-
cient pay, allowances, and working conditions. This can be expected to
reduce informal payments, but only as part of an overall strategy.
Fourth, our findings highlight the importance of stronger accountabil-
ity mechanisms, with enhanced monitoring and supervision of staff.
Weak supervision and oversight, as observed in many LMICs, creates
opportunities for rent seeking (Fjeldstad, 2004; SIKIKA, 2014). This
calls for stronger accountability and responsiveness to service users. In
the absence of adequate measures, the proliferation of an informal
healthcare market, including informal payments, can undermine other
measures to improve healthcare financing and delivery (Ensor and
Witter, 2001). Further research is also needed to understand how to
prevent some health workers from gaming the system, negotiating
deals with supervisors, or using personal networks to bypass sanctions.
This study has some limitations. First, our definition of informal
payment is narrow, capturing only the reported likelihood of engaging
in it rather than actual amounts paid and payment frequency.
However, for our purposes, this seemed preferable given the potential
for misreporting of detailed information, difficulties of recall and sensi-
tivity of the topic. Since engaging in informal payments was self-
reported and this is sensitive, we placed these questions towards the
end of the questionnaire, by when we had built a good rapport with
respondents. Second, since our analysis relied on data from public hos-
pitals and health centres and excluded dispensaries, we do not capture
the entire range of informal payments across facility types. However,
this decision was based on prior interviews and workshops which
revealed that informal payments are less common in dispensaries, espe-
cially in rural areas, due to the greater poverty in the area, while their
low staffing levels would have hampered implementation of the survey.
Third, we did not examine informal mechanisms emerging among net-
works of providers. Political science literature suggests that those net-
works can be important but we will explore them in further analysis of
our qualitative data. Lastly, since our question on whether a health
provider ever received/asked informal payments is sensitive and person-
al, the face-to-face interview might induce information bias. However,
we invested extensively in training data collectors to build a trusted
rapport with respondents (including role play), and our consent form
stated that the data will be anonymized and only used by researchers in
the project.
Conclusion
This study highlights how supply-side factors can influence informal
payments in developing countries as stipulated in our theoretical
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framework. We found evidence of the hypotheses arising from the
ACE approach, inspired by political settlement theory. Vertical en-
forcement of formal rules and more transparency might be not suffi-
cient to reduce informal payments, especially when powerful players
can bypass them easily. Conventional measures aimed at reducing
informal payments might lead to different responses among the vari-
ous actors, in some cases reinforcing underlying power distribution.
Indeed, we found that the chances of engaging in informal payments
varied by identifiable characteristics. This highlights the need to
identify subgroups for targeted measures. We also showed the po-
tential for providing entitlements and benefits in a timely way and
of continued supervision in reducing informal payments. To this
end, policy responses should address both different individual incen-
tives and system-level factors, including ensuring adequate health
sector financing, better and timely remuneration of frontline public
health providers, and enhanced governance and supervision.
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Méon P-G, Weill L. 2010. Is corruption an efficient grease? World
Development 38: 244–59.
Meskarpour Amiri M, Teymourzadeh E, Ravangard R, Bahadori M. 2019.
Health informal payments and their main determinants: the case of Iran.
Proceedings of Singapore Healthcare 1-10, doi:
10.1177/201010581882259, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.
1177/2010105818822594 (accessed on 3 May 2021).
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